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JUDICIAL ROLES IN NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
NUNO GAROUPA*
TOM GINSBURG
ABSTRACT

Judges perform nonjudicial functions in many contexts. Most
jurisdictions regulate these functions in multiple ways, by statute and by
custom. We provide a theory ofjudicial demand and judicial supply for
nonjudicial functions. By teasing out the determinants of judicial
involvement in nonjudicial functions, we show the potential market
failures and the needfor regulation. We suggest that some limitations on
the judicial exercise of nonjudicialfunctions seem justified. However,
these limits might vary acrossjurisdictionsdepending on institutionaland
contextualfactors.
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INTRODUCTION

We all know that the job of judges is to decide cases. Yet in many
jurisdictions, judges also engage in multiple nonjudicial functions ranging
from serving on law commissions, playing management roles, serving as
public intellectuals, and even serving as interim executives. In a notable
recent example, in the midst of a serious political and economic turmoil,
the President of the Greek Supreme Administrative Court was appointed
to be the interim Prime Minister.' Justices have also served as acting
presidents in Bolivia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.4 One of the most
significant constitutional crises in Brazilian history in October 1945 was
resolved when the incumbent president was forced to resign while the
Chief Justice was appointed as acting president.
Are there any limits to judicial engagement in nonjudicial functions?
Evidently the distinction between ajudicial and a nonjudicial function is in
itself complicated and convoluted. Case law has struggled to establish
clear legal doctrines that offer a concise definition of a judicial function.
Impartiality, non-partisanship, and adjudication seem to be associated with

1. See Helena Smith, Greece 's Interim Government Sworn in Before FreshElection, GUARDIAN
(May 16, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/ 16/greece-interim-government-sworn-in.
2. MARITES DANGUILAN VITUG, SHADOW OF DOUBT: PROBING THE SUPREME COURT 185
(2010) (describing resignation of Bolivian president and appointment of Chief Justice as caretaker).

3. Former Presidents: Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, THE BANGABHABAN: THE PRESIDENT
HOUSE OF BANGLADESH, http://www.bangabhaban.gov.bd/sayeed.html (last visited June 27. 2013).
4. The President: Previous Presidents, THE PRESIDENT: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN,
http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=2&sel=4&pld=9
(last visited June

27, 2013).
5. President Getulio Vargas lost popular support for his authoritarian government and was
forced to resign in October 1945. He was replaced by the Chief Justice Jose Linhares as acting
president from October 1945 to January 1946. Josi Linhares, PORTAL BRAZIL, http://www.brasil
.gov.br/linhadotempo/epocas/1945/jose-linhares (last visited June 27, 2013).
6. For example, under Australian law, judges play a judicial function when they address a
dispute to be resolved by application of law in order to establish facts and a binding resolution
accepted by parties. See Patrick Emerton & H. P. Lee, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in
Australia, in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 403 (H. P. Lee ed., 2011).
7. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 passim (1989).
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a judicial function.8 However, this conceptualization leaves an enormous
gray area of functions that fundamentally are also adjudicative in nature
and where judges are welcome due to their perceived independence and
impartiality. For example, when judges are involved in private arbitration,
is this a judicial function or not? The answer to this question is all but
clear.9
The involvement of judges in nonjudicial functions also raises
significant questions concerning the separation of powers doctrine.10 In
fact, when judges take an important role outside of the judicial branch of
government, they could be interfering directly with other branches as well
as undermining the independence of the judiciary by endorsing
extrajudicial adjudication or effectively undermining judicial review, for
example. Additionally, nonjudicial functions could seriously compromise
the impartiality of the judges in question. Furthermore, judicial
participation in extrajudicial roles raises questions concerning the extent to
which immunity privileges enjoyed by judges extend to nonjudicial
functions.11
Not surprisingly, most jurisdictions regulate judicial involvement in
nonjudicial functions. In the United States, the Code of Judicial Conduct
allows some involvement (mostly related to legal activities, education, and
charitable work) and prohibits others. 2 Participation in government
commissions and public hearings is usually the most controversial. 3 Other
jurisdictions, such as South Africa, have developed a specific
incompatibility test to decide on possible nonjudicial functions.14 Yet there
are also jurisdictions that have very few formal restrictions. 5 Most

8. See generally id.; see also Kable v DPP (ASW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Austl.) (showing same
point in the context of Australian law).
9. For example, New Zealand law has struggled with the meaning of tribunal until it was
clarified in 2008. See Geoffrey Palmer, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in New Zealand, in
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supranote 6, at 452.

10. See Emerton & Lee, supranote 6.
I1. In the United Kingdom, it has been clarified that judicial immunity applies only to judicial
functions. See Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Judges and Non-JudicialFunctions in the United Kingdom,
in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supranote 6, at 493.

12. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the United States, in
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supranote 6, at 512.

13. See id.
14. The incompatibility test was conceived after the Heath case when a High Court judge was
appointed to a special investigation unit in 2001. Later the Judicial Service Commission Amendment
Act 2008 was passed, which opened the way for further limitations on nonjudicial functions in the
future. See Cora Hoexter, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in South Africa, in JUDICIARIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 474.

15. For example, in Canada there are no significant constitutional constraints and only some
minor statutory limitations under the Federal Judges Act of 1985. See Patrick Monahan & Byron
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jurisdictions make a sharp difference between nonjudicial functions during
tenure and post-tenure, with less intensive restrictions for the latter. In the
words of the United States Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States,
"[t]he ultimate inquiry remains whether a particular extrajudicial
assignment undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch."16
Absent significant statutory limitations, Canada and Australia have
seen the development of the persona designata doctrine to regulate
judicial participation in activities outside of the judicial branch of
government. Perceived to be based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, the goal is to undermine possible uses of judicial power outside of
judicial functions.17
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider a judicial function an
activity exercised by a judge inside the courtroom whereas by nonjudicial
role we understand an activity exercised by a judge outside of the
courtroom.1 Thus, the phenomenon recently characterized as the
judicialization of public policy is usually achieved through formal court
decisions, and hence is considered a judicial function within our analysis.' 9
We recognize that there is some relationship between judicialization and
nonjudicial roles in the sense that an infinite judicialization would
inevitably eliminate nonjudicial roles as we understand them. However, by
clearly distinguishing nonjudicial functions from other well-known
phenomena, we provide for a better understanding ofjudicial behavior.
Based on our theory of judicial reputation, 20 we provide an explanation
for why judges might be involved in nonjudicial functions. Notice that

Shaw, The Impact of Extra-JudicialService on the Canadian Judiciary: The Aeed for Reform, in
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supranote 6, at 428.

16. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989).
17. See Emerton & Lee, supra note 6. The landmark cases are Drake v Minister of State for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 (Austl.), which questioned the appointment of a
judge of the Federal Court of Australia to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and Hilton v Wells
(1985) 157 CLR 57 (Austl.), which challenged a particular statute that allowed tapping by a warrant
issued by a judge of certain specific courts, therefore raising questions concerning the distinction
between "judge" and "court". Later Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 (Austl.), clarified the extent
to which a function exercised by a judge is within persona designata. In Wilson v Minister for
Aboriginaland Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 (AustI.), the High Court of Australia
decided that a judge of the Federal Court could not be involved with preparing a particular report in
relation to a public policy issue that demanded taking sides.
18. This is consistent with the Oxford English Dictionary which defines "extrajudicial" as
"[f]ying outside the proceedings in court." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 613 (2d ed. 1989).
19. On judicialization, see ALEC STONE SWEET & MARTIN SHAPIRO, ON LAW, POLITICS AND
JUDICIALIZATION (2003).

20. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, JudicialAudiences and Reputation: Perspectivesfrom
Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (2009); see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom
Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organizationof the Judiciary,4 J. OF COMP. L. 226 (2010);
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judicial involvement in nonjudicial functions requires two explanations.
First, judges have to be willing to perform such functions voluntarily,
meaning that they must enjoy some benefits generated within nonjudicial
tasks-the supply side. Second, other political and social relevant actors
must desire judicial participation. Judicial participation in nonjudicial
functions must yield certain payoffs to the relevant actors who select
them-the demand side. We contend that both parties are motivated by
reputation concerns; the judges wish to enhance their reputations, while
other actors seek to draw on the reputation of the judiciary for impartiality
and integrity. However, given that nonjudicial functions impose some
costs in terms of collective reputation on the judiciary, some limitations
are likely to be appropriate. In fact, we contend that potential market
failures justify some form of regulation in this context.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes possible
nonjudicial functions and the degree to which we expect them to be
performed by judges. Part II develops a theory of judicial participation in
nonjudicial functions. Part III concludes the Article.
I. NONJUDICIAL

FUNCTIONS

We can consider a continuum of nonjudicial functions in terms of
being more or less similar to judicial functions. At one end of the
spectrum, there are nonjudicial functions that can be seen as quasi-judicial
in nature or seemingly judicial functions. Next we move to nonjudicial
functions that benefit from judicial expertise or are related to courts and
the legal system more generally. We also have nonjudicial functions that
simply reflect community engagement. Finally, we have nonjudicial
functions attached to the other two branches of government: legislative
and executive. We also add business activities at the end of the list. In
particular, we suggest the following framework:
(i) Seemingly judicial functions: private arbitration, serving in
tribunals as a mediator or in ad-hoc tribunals on restorative justice;
(ii) Quasi-judicial functions: auxiliary functions such as electoral
courts, deciding presidential powers, supervising political parties;
(iii) Nonjudicial functions related to judicial functions:
management of courts, serving in judicial council or other

see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in ConstitutionalCourts: Party and
JudicialPolitics,28 ARIZ. J. OF INTL & COMP. L. 539 (2012).
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commissions related to the court system or to judicial selection,
retention, promotion, or disciplinary action;
(iv) Nonjudicial functions that are adjudicative in nature: chairing
inquiries (royal commissions in the United Kingdom or in Australia,
public hearings in the United States), special prosecutors,
specialized investigations on corruption or terrorism, adjudicating
impeachment of political actors;
(v) Nonjudicial functions that promote law: teaching and writing,
working in judicial associations;
(vi) Social and community activities: involvement with nonprofit
activities, participation in nonjudicial associations;
(vii) Seemingly legislative functions: participation in law making
commissions or working groups, serving on electoral boundaries
commissions, supervising constitutional amendments;
(viii) Seemingly executive functions: chairing administrative
agencies (usually crime prevention related); serving as ambassadors
or executive officers;
(ix) Full legislative functions: legislator;
(x) Full executive functions:
serving as ambassador; and

member of the administration,

(xi) Business activities: involvement with for-profit activities,
including lawyering and serving on corporate boards or
directorships.
These nonjudicial functions are not equivalent in nature. Arguments
that certain activities benefit from judicial skills and independence might
apply to the top of the list, but they are very unclear when we consider the
bottom of the list. Similarly, arguments against judicial involvement in
nonjudicial functions are apparently stronger for those at the bottom than
at the top of the list. Not surprisingly, most jurisdictions are permissive
with seemingly judicial or quasi-judicial functions but regulate more
extensively any judicial involvement in legislative and executive
functions.
Business activities might benefit from judicial knowledge and human
capital, in particular if the activities are law-related, but they expropriate
from the entire judiciary its collective investment on reputation and
prestige. They also undermine judicial impartiality and raise considerable
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concerns in relation to professional conflicts of interest. It is not surprising
that most jurisdictions prohibit such activities.
II. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL ROLES IN NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

A. Supply Side
Judges perform nonjudicial functions because they want to, but it is
unclear why this is the case. Multiple reasons might explain judicial
willingness to accept such a workload; these reasons are the determinants
of the supply side. It could merely be a question of remuneration, either
because the nonjudicial functions pay more or because they generate rents
to be recouped in the future. Monetary payoffs, immediate or deferred,
would be a good reason to opt for nonjudicial functions. A second possible
set of reasons is related to enhancing individual prestige or reputation.
Nonjudicial functions could provide better or new opportunities for
individual judges to become more popular with relevant audiences.
Nonjudicial functions could also reduce individual workload if they are
less demanding in terms of hours or intensity of work, though nonjudicial
functions might increase leisure opportunities. Finally, a third possible
argument would be political and social influence. An individual judge with
a particular ideological or social agenda could see a nonjudicial function
as instrumental in promoting such agenda.
Let us begin with our theory of reputation.2 1 We argue elsewhere that
judges need a good reputation in order to accomplish their tasks.
Furthermore, reputation requires team production; it has both an individual
and collective component. A judge's reputation contributes to that of the
judiciary as a whole, but also depends on that collective reputation. We
analyze how different sets of legal institutions are organized to emphasize
the individual or collective investment in reputation.
A judge taking on nonjudicial functions must compare the benefit to
the potential cost. Nonjudicial functions might generate two significant
costs. First, the judicial aura of impartiality and independence could be
compromised by a nonjudicial function. As the U.S. Supreme Court said
in Mistretta v. United States, "[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends upon its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political

21. See Garoupa & Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Party and Judicial
Politics, supra note 20.
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branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action."22 An
erosion of judicial prestige and reputation, or even political compromise,
in the future might be a significant risk both in terms of monetary and
nonmonetary payoffs. Second, nonjudicial functions could preempt or
undermine further judicial advancement in terms of career goals and
promotion to higher courts, depending on the response of others to a
judge's actions.
At the same time, judges may benefit from engaging in nonjudicial
functions. One benefit is diversification of markets in which reputation is
built. A judge who works entirely within the judiciary may be less well
known outside of it and may want to diversify sources of reputation
building. This may only make sense once a certain amount of internal
reputational capital has been built. Furthermore, some judges may have
particular skills, such as writing books and magazine articles. These
judges may receive more marginal payoff to reputation-building by
engaging in extrajudicial activities, at least up to a certain point. The
existence of multiple markets for reputation building may enhance the
overall prestige of the judiciary, given the range of judicial skills and
personalities.
The balance between anticipated benefits and expected costs will
determine the extent to which an individual judge might accept a
nonjudicial function. It is likely that the profile of benefits and costs for
the same nonjudicial function varies among individual judges. The
possibility of nonjudicial functions induces a selection effect. Certain
types of individuals will be more prone to seek nonjudicial appointments
than others. For example, consider the standard distinction between career
and recognition judiciaries. 23 Nonjudicial functions are likely to appeal
more to recognition judiciaries for whom external audiences are more
important than to career judges who are usually more focused on internal
incentives. The potential costs of nonjudicial functions are also plausibly
more significant when judicial selection and promotion is totally
depoliticized and there is a well-structured career. The reason is that
contamination by nonjudicial issues is likely to be more costly in a career
judiciary than in a recognition judiciary given the institutional design. An
immediate prediction would be that the role of nonjudicial functions will
be more visible in recognition judiciaries than in career judiciaries, an
observation that seems fairly consistent with the evidence.

22. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1988).
23. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid JudicialCareer Structures: Reputation Versus
Legal Tradition, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2011).
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There are also significant moral hazard implications. The existence of
nonjudicial functions is likely to distort or influence the incentives for
judicial performance. To the extent that nonjudicial functions are
generated or created by certain external audiences, individual judges might
be more willing to appeal to such audiences. In some ways, this
willingness could enhance judicial independence if judicial independence
is instrumental to get these outside opportunities. In other ways, it could
undermine judicial independence if partiality or partisanship is important
to benefit from nonjudicial payoffs.
Another plausible effect that nonjudicial payoffs could have is an
adverse selection effect at entry level. Certain individuals might be more
interested in a judicial career or appointment if nonjudicial functions are
available. This could be problematic if it induces individuals to perceive a
judicial appointment as merely instrumental to achieve a nonjudicial
function. If the skills and attributes of judicial and nonjudicial functions
are aligned, such effect is not very relevant. However, if the skills and
attributes of a nonjudicial function conflict with those of a judicial
function, individuals with the "wrong" skill sets might seek judicial
appointments.
Shifts in the supply function will respond to changes in the balance of
benefits and costs. For example, a continuous erosion of judicial monetary
payoffs (because salaries are not increased) might see an increase in
willingness to serve on nonjudicial functions. Fewer opportunities to
receive promotions in the judicial career could also expand the supply
curve. At the same time, excessive political polarization in nonjudicial
functions is likely to diminish the supply curve as judges may become
cautious about surrendering their prestige. The perception that nonjudicial
functions might increase the likelihood of being expelled from the
judiciary could have a significant chilling effect.24
B. Demand Side
We turn now to explanations for why certain groups or other branches
of government might want judges to perform nonjudicial functions. The
most immediate explanation is judicial skills and human capital. Certain
tasks or jobs benefit from specialized skills or accumulated human capital
particular to the judiciary. Therefore, unsurprisingly, judges are recruited

24. See, e.g., Raphael Minder, Spanish Judge Is Acquitted ofAbusing His Authority, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/world/europe/prominentspanish-judge-cleared-of-abusing-powers.html.
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to perform such nonjudicial functions. The examples relate to law,
adjudication, interpretation, review, and even fact finding.
If in some cases there is a genuine demand for judicial independence
and impartiality, in other cases recruiting judges allows political actors to
free ride on such convenient prestige. One example is using judges to lead
politically sensitive inquiries or involving them in consultations for new
legislation.2 5 Judicial participation in these nonjudicial functions might be
beneficial given judicial human capital, but it also gives credibility or
legitimizes a particular, potentially politicized outcome. Certain tasks
performed by judges will be regarded in better consideration than if
performed by politicians or other actors.
There are collective costs of using judges to perform nonjudicial
functions, however. The most serious cost is eroding judicial prestige,
which could undermine judicial independence and separation of powers in
the future.2 6 Another potential cost is the creation of alternative methods of
adjudication that will inevitably compete with and possibly undermine the
public system of adjudication.
The general quality of institutions might determine shifts in the demand
curve. In a system of generally poor institutions but with a good judiciary,
we expect demand to be high and judicial involvement with nonjudicial
functions to be more frequent. Where the judiciary is poor but other
institutions good, demand will likely be low.
A generalized loss of prestige by the political elites usually induces the
demand curve to expand; more judicial involvement in nonjudicial
functions is expected. We thus see politicians turning to judges at times of
crisis to restore integrity to the system. On the other hand, excessively
controversial judicial decisions could see the demand curve reduced in
following periods.
C. PotentialMarket Failures
Having explained demand and supply curves for judicial involvement
with nonjudicial functions, we can easily derive an equilibrium in which

25. See infra text accompanying notes 48-52 (judges in royal commissions); see also J.B. Coyne,
Judges and Royal Commissions, 37 CAN. L. TIMES 416 (1917) (describing early criticism of the
practice).
26. For example, simple participation in constitutional conventions could change judicial
preferences. See Edward N. Beiser, Jay S. Goodman, & Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., Judicial Role in a
Nonjudicial Setting: Some Empirical Manifestations and Consequences, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 571
(1971). Notice, however, that in this empirical study there was a serious selection effect since judges
participating in those conventions had a political past.
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judges will serve in nonjudicial functions in response to demand and
supply determinants. There are good reasons to suspect that such
equilibrium is not efficient because there are potential market failures. The
most immediate is that the demand-side costs might be externalized and
therefore not actually borne by those who seek judges in nonjudicial
functions.
Rationally we should say that judicial involvement with nonjudicial
functions would be appropriate when the benefits outweigh the costs. The
critical issue is that such benefits and costs are not symmetrically
distributed across the population of interested parties. In many occasions,
the benefit is concentrated in a particular political or social actor who has
the power to appoint a judge to a nonjudicial function. Yet the cost is
disseminated, if not borne heavily by the judiciary at large. Those who
bear such costs might not be in a position to effectively oppose judicial
involvement with nonjudicial functions.
The unbalanced distribution of benefits and costs might justify
regulation of judicial involvement in nonjudicial functions as a precommitment mechanism to avoid opportunism by those who benefit.
Inevitably this regulation has to be effective and sufficient to avoid
conflicts of interpretation that could impose significant costs on the
judiciary if the courts are required to adjudicate cases where they have a
direct interest. Another possible solution is self-regulation by the judiciary.
However, it is unclear if the interests of the judiciary are always aligned
with those of the community at large.
Not all nonjudicial functions have the same balance of potential costs
and benefits. In fact, those that are more similar to judicial functions in
nature are likely to maximize the net benefit for both judges and the
relevant actors. Therefore, most legal systems are more permissive in
terms of allowing quasi-judicial functions even if under some particular
contexts such as a leave of absence without remuneration. 27 As we go
down the list, not only is it less likely that there will be an aggregate net
benefit, but also conflicts of interest across actors emerge. Unsurprisingly,
most legal systems prohibit such nonjudicial functions.28 Some even limit
such functions after judges retire by imposing some time lag between
leaving the bench and performing such nonjudicial functions.

27. See infra Part Ill.
28. Id.
29. See infra text accompanying note 131 (Chinese judges restricted from serving as lawyers for
two years after retirement).
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Another possible interpretation of this problem is to consider the nature
of judicial independence and prestige as a public good among judges.
Judges contribute to creating the public good, which forms a collective
stock of reputational capital. But once built, there is a danger that it will be
over-used and dissipated in nonjudicial functions that may benefit only a
particular group of political actors. The public good nature requires some
form of regulatory intervention to avoid excessive dissipation.
A second potential market failure is the possibility of supply-induced
demand. The judiciary could engage in strategic development of a
reputation for independence and impartiality to induce additional demand
for nonjudicial functions. This is a risky strategy since judicial decisions
would be merely instrumental in order to achieve a longer-term goal
unrelated to judicial functions. Furthermore, this strategy could be
perceived as an expropriation strategy. The external benefits created by an
independent judiciary are to be appropriated by individual judges seeking
nonjudicial functions. Such expropriation is problematic in terms of
efficient incentives and adequate distribution of payoffs. It seems
appropriate to limit the possibility for supply-induced demand. Selfregulation by the judiciary would not be an efficient mechanism since it
could easily be captured to promote such supply-induced demand.
Regulation by an external body or by statutory intervention seems
advisable.
Another related failure concerns the different market structures in
judicial and nonjudicial functions. Judges have a monopoly on judicial
functions, with the exclusive ability to engage in them. However, when it
comes to nonjudicial functions, judges inevitably compete with other
groups or professions. One possible consequence is that judges could use
their monopoly rents obtained in judicial functions to promote their
involvement in nonjudicial functions. One might think of this in economic
terms as exercising a form of dumping against competing groups. Judges
might shape adjudication and judge-made law to promote their reputation
with relevant audiences and undermine possible competition for
nonjudicial functions. For example, imagine a judicial decision requiring
certain forms of investigative commission have judicial membership.
These strategies are more costly when they promote the interests of the
judiciary, but not those of society. Regulation might be necessary to
restrict judicial ability to exploit these monopoly rents. In this context, it is
also unlikely that self-regulation by the judiciary would be enough since,
precisely due to monopoly power, there is little pressure within the
judiciary to curtail their monopoly rents. However, regulation by a third
party should also be carefully designed because competing groups might
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lobby for excessive limitations so to avoid the competition of judges for
nonjudicial functions.
III. DISCUSSION OF EXAMPLES

A. UnitedStates
Judges in the United States, at both federal and state level, engage in a
range of nonjudicial functions. This has been the topic of public debate,
academic commentary, and official hearings.30 The very first Chief Justice,
John Jay, was given ex officio roles serving on a debt commission and
inspecting the mint.3 ' He later ran for Governor of New York, and
eventually resigned the Court to take that position.32 Chief Justice Jay was
also sent to England to negotiate the treaty that bears his name.33 Although
there has been less explicit involvement in public offices in more recent
times, some have asserted that particular justices have political
ambitions.34 And there has, by some accounts, been an increase in judges
writing commentaries and giving speeches. 35
Nonjudicial functions are regulated by judicial codes of conduct, found
in virtually every state. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
includes as Canon 3 a requirement that "[a] judge shall conduct the
judge's personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of
conflict with the obligations of judicial office."36 The rules include
relatively strict prohibitions against judicial engagement in nonjudicial
functions.3 For example, Rule 3.4 requires that "[a] judge shall not accept

30. NonjudicialActivities of Supreme Court Justicesand Other FederalJudges: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on SeparationofPoiwers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong. 136 (1969).
31. Leslie B Dubeck, Understanding "Judicial Lockjaw": The Debate Over Extrajudicial
Activity, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 589 (2007).
32. Id. at 590.
33. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and Great Britain
(Jay Treaty), U.S.-U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; see generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S
TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (1923).
34.

BRUCE

ALLEN

MURPHY,

THE

BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER

CONNECTION:

THE

SECRET

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 267 (1982) (arguing that Frankfurter

believed William Douglas had presidential ambitions); Peter Alan Bell, Extrajudicial Activiy of
Supreme CourtJustices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1970).
35. RICHARD POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY IN DECLINE 364 (2003) (discussing

judges as public intellectuals).
36.

MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT

Canon 3 (2011), available at http://www.american

bar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model code of judicial conduct/model code
of judicial conduct canon 3.html.
37. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 584 (including more commentaries in last seventy years); see id at
587 (including more speeches).
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appointment to a governmental committee, board, commission, or other
governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice." 8 Typically, judges may speak,
write, lecture, teach, and participate in other professional activities on
legal and nonlegal subject matters3 9 Judges may sit on professional and
nonprofit boards, but are to limit their involvement in organizations that
might be engaged in judicial proceedings.) On occasion, states discipline
judges for such involvementi.41
The issue has raised particular attention with regard to the U.S.
Supreme Court, whose justices have engaged in frequent speech-giving on
various topics of public import.42 The extent of this activity has, by some
accounts, increased since the days in which Justice Frankfurter referred to
the need for judicial self-restraint as a case of "judicial lockjaw".43 The
standard analysis cautions about the effect on judicial independence from
judicial speech-giving, book-writing, and appearances at public events.44
The same issues arise with regard to other nonjudicial functions, such as
serving on commissions or government bodies. The U.S. Supreme Court
itself considered the issue in Mistretta v. United States, quoted above,
which considered the constitutionality of a judge serving on the U.S.
Sentencing Commission.45 It was alleged that, as a rulemaking body, the
Sentencing Commission involved administrative rather than judicial
power. 46 The Court found that the activity did not violate the separation of
powers.4 In short, the U.S. approach tends to limit judicial involvement
through codes of ethics, and has over the years shifted in the direction of
limited judicial involvement relative to some other jurisdictions.

38.

MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT

R. 3.4 (2011), available at http://www.american

bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/2011 mcjc rule3_4.authcheckdam
.pdf
39. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4(B) (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/

documents/ca code Judicial ethics.pdf
40. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4(C)(3)(c) (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/ca codejudicial ethics.pdfd.
41. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey and
Critique of the Laiw, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 225, 238-41 (1980) (listing types of conduct for which
judges have been disciplined).
42. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 571 n.8 (discussing debate).
43. Felix Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions of Judges: Should a Judge "Think Beyond the
Judicial'?,34 A.B.A. J. 656, 658 (1948).
44. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 572 (defining extrajudicial conduct to include partisan activities,
ex officio activities, academic activities and public speeches).
45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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B. UnitedKingdom
Judges in the United Kingdom have a long tradition of leading
commissions of inquiry in matters of public importance, including most
recently an inquiry into the role of the press and police in the Rupert
Murdoch phone-hacking scandal. 48 The role of judges in extrajudicial roles
garnered a good deal of public attention in the case of Ex PartePinochet,
when it was learned that one of the judges in the case, Lord Hoffman, had
been a director of Amnesty International while hearing the case. 49 A
notable recent case involved an inquiry into the death of David Butler, a
former U.N. Weapons Inspector. o This and other prominent cases led to a
debate about the use of judges to chair public inquiries into matters of
political controversy." The Government Department of Constitutional
Affairs subsequently produced a Consultation Paper on "Effective
Inquiries."52 This reported that there had been 30 major inquiries since
1990, costing an estimated E300 million. It concluded that it can be
appropriate for judges to chair inquiries because "[t]he judiciary has a
great deal of experience in analysing evidence, determining facts and
reaching conclusions, albeit in an adversarial rather than inquisitorial
context. The judiciary also has a long tradition of independence from
politics, and judges are widely accepted to be free from any party political
bias."53 The report seems to double down on judicial leadership, as it
recommends the expansion of statutory powers for inquiries to include
powers to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents,
as well as other quasi-judicial processes.54 Other cases ofjudges becoming
involved in nonjudicial functions include a recent case in which a private
company appointed a sitting judge to inquire into its own financial
-55
malpractice.

48. THE LEVENSON INQUIRY, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (last visited June 27, 2013).
49. Warren Hoge, PinochetLawyers Challenge Judge's Impartiality,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998,
at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/16/world/pinochet-lawyers-challenge-judge-simpartiality.html.
50. THE HUTTON INQUIRY, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://
www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
5 1. Tim Buley, Judges Chairing Public Inquiries: Observations on DCA Effective Inquiries, 9
JUD. REv. 293 (2004).
52.

GR.

BRIT.

DEP'T

OF CONST.

AFF.,

EFFECTIVE INQUIRIES:

A

CONSULTATION

PAPER

PRODUCED BY THE DEP'T OF CONST. AFF. (2004).

53. Id. 46.
54. See id., Summary and Request for Views (including a list of powers for possible future
legislation: the taking of evidence, cross-examination, legal representations, oaths, and other quasijudicial procedures).
55. Jonathan Russell, Olympus Appoints High Court Judge to Head 'Improper Payments' Probe
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C. Israel
Like other common law jurisdictions, judges in Israel routinely lead

commissions of inquiry. High profile examples include the Agranat
Commission on the Yom Kippur War, the Kahan Commission, which
investigated the conduct of the 1982 Lebanon war, and a recent
commission to inquire into the flotilla incident.5 6
D. Canada
Canada also regularly relies on judges to participate in commissions of
inquiry. On occasion, such activities have led to controversy. In 2003,
retired Supreme Court Justice John Gomery was named to lead an inquiry
into allegations of corruption and mismanagement in a federal sponsorship
program, and to formulate positive recommendations. The ultimate report,
which implicated Prime Minister Jean Chr6tien, led to significant
controversy and was characterized as overly engaged in partisan activity.
When Chr6tien engaged in legal action to clear his name, the Federal
Court ultimately quashed the finding of the inquiry.
In another case, controversy erupted over Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin's involvement in the awarding of the Order of Canada to a
doctor who performed abortions. 59 Yet such controversies have not
reduced the practice. It is particularly common for retired judges to play
this role, as illustrated by a recent appointment to head an inquiry into socalled "queue-jumping" in the public health system in Alberta."o

Panel,TELEGRAPH (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/media
technologyandtelecoms/electronics/8863139/Olympus-appoints-high-court-iudge-to-head-improper-pay
ments-probe-panel.html.
56. Agranat Commission, KNESSET OF ISRAEL WEBSITE, http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/

agranat eng.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at
the Refugee Camps in Beirut [Kahan Commission], ISRAELI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook6/pages/1040% 20report%/200f%/20th
e%20commissiono20of%20inquiryo20intoo20theo20e.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2013); CNN
Wire Staff, Israel Names Head of Commissionfor Flotilla Inquiry, CNN: WORLD (June 13, 2012),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-13/world/israel.flotilla.inquiry_1_gaza-strip-israeli-policy-israeli-raid?
s=PM:WORLD.
57. Adam M. Dodek, Judicial Independence as a Public Policy Instrument, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CONTEXT 295 (Adam M. Dodek & Lorne Sossin eds., 2010).

58. Tonda MacCharles, Gomery Was Biased in Report, Judge Rules, TORONTO STAR, June 27,
2008, at Al, availableat http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/450179.
59. Canwest News Service, Chief Justice Sheds Light on Morgentaler's Order of Canada
Appointment, MONTREAL GAZETTE (Aug. 16, 2008), http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/
story.html?id=7d8564bb-eca3-4404-9d6b-f96c66b5416c.
60. Canadian Press, Retired Judge to Head Alberta Queue-Jumping Health Inquiry, CBC NEWS
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/story/2012/03/05/calgary-health-inquiry-
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E. Australia
Judges in Australia have a long tradition of engaging in a number of

non-judicial functions, including sitting on the Law Reform
Commission, 1 the Australian Competition Tribunal,62 and taking on
various executive tasks-at least three members of the senior judiciary
have served as Ambassadors.6 3 Judges regularly serve as leaders of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which is an administrative body.64 And
recently, the Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court was
appointed chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation .65
This practice has prompted a nuanced jurisprudence and some good
academic commentary, including a recent contribution from Chief Justice
R. S. French. 66 The courts in at least one state have taken the position that
sitting judges should not be able to sit on extrajudicial government bodies,
as it might undermine public confidence. 7 There has also been discussion
over whether the proper role of judges might vary with conditions, such as
wartime or emergency. 68
Australian law defines judicial power as involving a dispute to be
resolved by a binding decision applying specified legal criteria to
ascertained facts.6 9 In cases refining this test, Australian courts have found
that judicial engagement in some inquiry-type functions is incompatible
with the judicial role. 0 One distinction in Australian law is between
nonjudicial tasks conferred upon the office of the judge and those

head-announced.html.
61.

Commissioners, AUSTRALIAN

LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.alrc.gov.au/about/

commissioners (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
62. Members of the Australian Competition Tribunal, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION TRIBUNAL,
http://www.competitiontribunal.gov.au/about/members (last modified Jan. 11, 2012).
63. Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 403.
64. Id.
65.

James Spiegelman Named as New ABC chairman, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 8,

2012), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/james-spigelman-named-as-new-abc-chairman
-20120308-1ulfw.html.
66. R. S. French, Executive Toys Judges and Non-judicial Functions, 19 J. JUD. ADMIN. 5
(2009); see generally Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 403. Some of the practices analyzed by Chief
Justice French are, in our view, standard functions of executive oversight, such as issuing search
warrants and orders for preventative detention. See Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 (Austl.)
(judges participating in issuing covert warrants to authorize interception of communications).
67. Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 414 (describing position of Victorian judiciary in 1923).
68. Fiona Wheeler, ParachutingIn: War and Extra-JudicialActivity by High Court Judges, 38
FED. L. REV. 485 (2010).
69. Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Austl.). See Emerton &
Lee, supranote 6, at 405-06.
70. Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR I
(Austl.).
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conferred upon an individual judge in her personal capacity, known as the
so-called persona designata exception. Courts tend to ask whether the
conferral of the function in a personal capacity will undermine the
performance ofjudicial functions or the appearance of independence.
For example, in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
IslanderAffairs, the Court considered whether a sitting federal judge could
be nominated, in his personal capacity, to provide a report to the
government in accordance with a scheme in which outsiders were called
on to evaluate Aboriginal claims for preservation of particular lands. It
found the scheme violated the separation of powers, as it involved the
judge in a function that was essentially political in character. 72
F. South Africa
South African judges sometimes lead commissions of inquiry. In one
notable case, the South African Special Investigating Units and Special
Tribunals Act (SIU Act) empowered the president to set up special units,
including judges, to investigate corruption. In South African Association
of Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath, the Constitutional Court found that
the functions conferred on a judge by the SIU Act compromised the
separation of the courts from other arms of government. Citing several
Australian cases, the Court argued that it blurred the line between the
courts and other branches of government, undermining the independence
of the judiciary.
G. Other Common Law Jurisdictions
Judges in South Asia are among the most respected figures in
government, and hence are sometimes called upon to take on very high
profile nonjudicial tasks.76 A judge in Sri Lanka was recently appointed to

71. Emerton & Lee, supranote 6, at 410-12.
72. Wilson (1996) 189CLRat 17-19.
73. See, e.g., Nthambelini Gabara, Judge Appointed to Probe Cricket SA Saga, ALLAFRICA
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201111041280.html.
74. Denise Meyerson, Extra-JudicialService on the Part of Judges: ConstitutionalImpediments
in Australia and South Africa, 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 181, 181-82 (2003).
75. South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) (S.
Aft.).
76. See Case Comment, MD Aftauddin v Bangladesh & Ors: Independent Judiciary-Consultation
Requiredfor Promotion of Judge to a Non-Judicial Post, 3 COMMONWEALTH HUM. RTS. L. DIG. 38
(1996).
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a cabinet post.77 Judges in India have headed the Press Council, a body
that serves as a press watchdog, the Human Rights Panel of West
Bengal, 8 and the Competition Tribunal.79 They also routinely serve as
heads of commissions of inquiry, including cases involving foreign policy,
such as when a former Chief Justice was sent to investigate the change of
power in the Maldives in 2012." In 2012, a retired Justice of the Supreme
Court of India aroused controversy by engaging in an extensive debate in
print over the merits of a decision in which he had been involved.81
Pakistan's judiciary has likewise been involved in commissions
investigating such matters as the causes and circumstances of the 1971
civil war,82 the sheltering and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad,
and the murder of a journalist that had reported on Al-Qaeda. 84 In one
notable case, a two-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Pakistan heard
corruption allegations against the Court itself, gave a verdict, and found
the Court and its judges not guilty.85
In The Gambia, a Court of Appeal Judge was recently appointed as
Attorney General and Minister of Justice.86 Other countries use judges
regularly for commissions of inquiry.

77. Quintus Perera, Justice L K Wimalachandra Appointed as Commissioner for Tourism, ASIAN
(Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.asiantribune.com/?q-node/9733.

TRIBUNE

78.

Retd SC Judge to Head State HR Panel, TIMES OF INDIA (May 31, 2012), http:/articles.

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-03-31/kolkata/31265952 1 retd-sc-judge-chief-justice-permanentjudge.
79. See Introduction, COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, compat.nic.in/introduction.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2013) (mentioning formerjustices).
80. Maneesh Chhibber, India Sent Former CJ to Probe Maldives Transfer of Power, INDIAN
EXPRESS (May 22, 2012), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-sent-former-ci-to-probe-maldives
-transfer-of-power/9521 08.
81. Arghya Sengupta, A Casefor JudicialLockjaw,HINDU (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.thehindu
.com/opinion/lead/article2935696.ece (discussing case of Justice Kumar Ganguly).
82. Zafar Abbas, Pakistan Declassifies 1971 War Report, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2000),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/1094788.stm.
83. Hanif Khalid, Abbottabad Commission Points Finger at PM Others, NEWS INT'L (May 2,
2012), http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14305-Abbottabad-Commission-points-finger at-PM-others.
84.

SALEEM SHAHZAD MURDER INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (Jan. 10,

2012).
85. Qaiser Zulfiqar, Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar Case: Verdict Clears Court, Judges of Wrongdoing,
EXPRESS TRIB. (June 15, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/394065/dr-arsalan-iftikhar-case-verdictclears-court-judges-of-wrongdoing/.
86. 6 More CabinetAppointments, DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 13, 2012), http://observer.gm/africa/
gambia/article/6-more-cabinet-appointments.
87. See, e.g., Cocaine Was Swapped Before Being Tendered in Court Justice Dordzie
Committee, GHANA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Social/
Cocaine-was-swapped-before-tendered-in-court-Justice-Dordzie-Committee/?ci=4&ai=37825.
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H France
In France, nonjudicial functions by judges are regulated by statutory
law, mainly the Code de l'organisationjudiciaire and the Ordonnance no
58-12 70 portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature.88 The
enforcement of the appropriate rules is mainly left to the Judicial
Council. 9 According to French law, the exercise of judicial functions is
incompatible with the exercise of all public functions and any other
occupation or employment. 90 Individual exemptions may, however, be
granted to the judges by decision of the president of the court in which
they work.9' These exemptions cover teaching and other functions or
activities that do not harm independence.9 2 However, arbitration activities
are excluded.93 Still, judges may without prior authorization engage in
scientific, literary, or artistic work.94
French judges are traditionally not known for becoming involved in
nonjudicial roles, which is consistent with the local legal culture that has
historically been based on a general distrust of the "noblesse de robe."
The participation of judges and prosecutors, unlike in Germany or in Italy,
is merely residual.
I. Germany
In Germany, there is a long tradition of judges serving in high profile
nonjudicial functions. For example, Roman Herzog held the office of
President of Germany (a largely ceremonial role) from 1994 to 1999 as a
96
member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Prior to

88. See Code de lOrganisation Judiciatre [Code for the Organization of the Judiciary] (Fr.),
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXTOOOO06071164&date
Texte=20080505; see also Ordonnance 58-1270 du 22 d6cembre 1958 portant loi organique relative au
statut de la magistrature [Order 58-1270 of Dec. 22, 1958 concerning the Organic Law on the Status of
the Judiciary],

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF

FRANCE] Dec. 23, 1958, p. 11551, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid
Texte=LEGITEXT000006069212&dateTexte=20090320.
89. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial
Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 53, 73-75 (2009)
90. See Ordonnance 58-1270, art. 8 (Fr.).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. "Nobility of the robe," referring to the hereditary judiciary in France before 1789. See
Noblesse de Robe, BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/416997/noble
sse-de-robe (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
96. Roman Herzog, BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/264038/
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this political office, Herzog served as a judge of the German
97 He was appointed to
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
the federal court in 1983 and, from 1987 to 1994, he was the President of
the Constitutional Court. 98 He went straight from this post to the
presidency of the country. 99
In Germany, nonjudicial functions are generally regulated by statute.
For example, a judge may act as chairman in conciliation agencies and in
corresponding independent agencies pursuant to section 104, sentence 2 of
the
Federal
Personnel
Representation
Act
(Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz).00 A judge can additionally act as a
conciliator in disputes between associations or between the associations
and third parties. 101 A judge may only be granted permission to act
additionally as an arbitrator or give an expert opinion in arbitration
proceedings when the parties to the arbitration agreement jointly designate
her, or when she is appointed by an agency that is not a party to the
proceeding. 0 2 Such permission must be refused if, at the time of the
decision regarding the granting of permission is made, the judge is seized
of the case.10 3 Furthermore, "a professor of law or of political science who
has civil servant status and who is also a judge may draw up expert legal
opinions and give legal advice with the permission of the highest public
authority administering the courts. Such permission shall only be granted
generally or in an individual case where the judicial activity of the
professor does not exceed the scale of an additional activity and it is not to
be feared that official interests are being impaired."104 A judge may
"undertake research and give lessons at a scientific institution of higher
education, at a public teaching institution, or at an official teaching
10 5
institution and perform duties in matters concerned with examination."
Finally, statutory provision can be made to the effect that, where the
situation in the labor market is such that there is an exceptional shortage of

Roman-Herzog (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz [BPersVG] [Federal Personnel Representation Act], Mar.
15, 1974, BGBl. I at 693 (Ger.), available at JuRIS. See also Deutsches Richtergesetz [DRiG] [German
Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972, BGBl. I at 713 (Ger.), § 4, available at JURIS (translation available at
http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englischdrig/).
101. DRiG, §40.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.§ 41.
105. Id. §4.
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applicants and consequently an urgent public interest exists in employing
larger numbers of candidates for the public service, a judge shall on
application be granted unpaid leave for a duration of one to six years.
During the period for which permission has been granted, he will refrain
from engaging in paid additional activities and only engage in paid
activities pursuant the law without infringing his official duties.106 Also, a
judge shall be granted part-time employment up to half of normal service.
The judge may undertake, during the period in which permission is
granted, to enter into professional commitments outside his activities in
the judiciary only to the extent to which the exercise of paid additional
activities is permitted under section 71 of the Act read in conjunction with
section 42 of the Federal Civil Servants Act (Bundesbeantengesetz).107
Clearly German judges face significant limitations on nonjudicial activity,
but these are largely comparable to other civil servants.
J. Other Civil Law Jurisdictionsin Europe
In Italy, nonjudicial functions are regulated by statute, in particular the
law of judicial organization (ordinamento giudiziario). Most of the
effective enforcement of the statute, however, is left to the Italian Judicial
Council.108 For example, a judge may only be granted permission to act
additionally as an arbitrator or give an expert opinion in arbitration
proceedings by the Judicial Council (Consiglio Superiore della
Magistratura).109 Furthermore, a judge may be in charge of the
management in a public charity institution, but he is not allowed to receive
any fees or remuneration. 0 A judge may "undertake research and give
instruction at a scientific institution of higher education, at a public
teaching institution, or at an official teaching institution and perform
duties in matters concerned with examination."'" Some political functions
are expressly allowed. To start, judges can serve in the Judicial Council.
They can also be a senator or serve in the National Council. 112
There has been some involvement of the Italian judiciary in nonjudicial
roles. To a large extent, the strict rules announced by statute are diluted by
the practices of the Italian Judicial Council that grants permission for

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. §48b.
Id. §76c.
Regio Decreto 30 gennajo 1941 n.12, art. 16 (It.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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many of these activities. Italian judges and prosecutors have been active in
party politics and have served in the executive and legislative branches.113
A similar observation can be made for Spain and Portugal. In both
countries, nonjudicial functions are regulated by law (Estatuto dos
MagistradosJudiciais in Portugal and Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial in
Spain).114 These statutes broadly impede judges' ability to serve in
nonjudicial functions but also allow the local Judicial Council to make
exceptions. In fact, these statutes tend to establish that serving judges shall
not be appointed to judicial functions unrelated to the work of the courts
without the authorization of the competent Judicial Council.'" The
practice of these councils (dominated by judges) shapes the involvement
ofjudges in nonjudicial roles.
In Spain and Portugal, several judges have served in the executive
branch, usually as Minister of Justice, heads of agencies within the
Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Interior, or in committees of experts for
legislative reforms. These situations broadly result from exceptions
granted by the local judicial council. Judicial involvement in the
legislative branch (as congressperson or senator) is less common.,6
K Latin America
In Latin America, judicial activities are defined by statute (Ley
Orgdnica del Poder Judicial in Argentina, Ley Orgdnica Constitucional
del Poder Judicial in Chile, Ley Orgainica del Poder Judicial de la
Federaci6n in Mexico, Lei Organica da Magistratura Nacional in
Brazil)."' These laws tend to be strict, but the practice varies with the
political context and the role played by judicial councils. For example, in

113. David Nelken, The Judges and PoliticalCorruptionin Italy, 23 J.L. & Soc' Y95 (1996),
114. Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais, Lei No. 21/85 de 19 de Julho de 1985, LEX INTEGRAL
(Port.), available at http://www.verbojuridico.com/legisl/estatutos/eni.html; Ley Organica del Poder
Judicial (B.O.E. 1985, 6) (Spain), available at http://noticias juridicas.com/base-datos/Admin/lo61985.html
115. Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais, art. 13, § 1.
116. The most famous and emblematic case is that of Judge Baltasar Garz6n, who was a junior
minister. See, e.g., Giles Tremlett, Don Quixote-or a Superhero? Profile of Baltasar Garzdn,
OBSERVER (U.K.) (Oct. 18, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/19/spain-franco.
117. Law No. 5827, July 13, 1955, B.O. 12-07-55 (Arg.), available at http://www.gob
.gba.gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/1-5827.html;

CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES

[COD. ORG.

TRIB.] [Judiciary Code] (Chile), available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=25563; Ley
Organica del Poder Judicial de la Federaci6n [LOPJF] [Enabling Law for the Federal Judiciary], Diario
Oficial de la Federacion [DO] 26 de mayo de 1995 (Mex.), available at http://www.cem.itesm.mx/
derecho/nlegislacion/federal/184/index.html; Lei Complementar No. 35, de 14 de Margo de 1979,
DiARIo OFICIAL DA UNiAo [D.O.U.] de 14.03.1979 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp35.htm.
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Mexico, judges are only allowed to engage in nonjudicial functions if
honorary and not remunerated.118 Still, involvement in political or quasipolitical activities is managed by the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de
la Judicatura Federal).119 In particular, the role of the Electoral Court,
where judges can challenge the results of federal elections of legislators
and the president, has been controversial .120
An identical situation is found in Argentina. The role of the judicial
council (Consejo de la Magistratura)and of the Supreme Court has been
significant in expanding nonjudicial functions in an environment with
strict statututory rules. Some judges have been famous for performing
seemingly executive functions, such as Judge Norberto Oyarbide, who has
served in prominent investigative roles.121 At the same time, judges
investigating political figures have been removed by the judicial bodies in
122
a politicized environment.
Brazil is no different. The recently created judicial council (Conselho
Nacional de Justiga) has struggled with effectively limiting nonjudicial
functions, corruption, and nepotism.123 Although judges cannot participate
in politics,124 they have an important role. Judicial associations are very
active and shape relevant areas of public policy; judges can be involved
with associations but cannot be remunerated. 12 5
Chile follows a similar pattern. Of particular note, judges can defend
themselves in personal lawsuits or lawsuits against their wives, husbands,
ascendants, descendants, siblings, or pupilS.126

118. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 101 ("The Ministers of
the Supreme Court of Justice, the Circuit Magistrates, the District Judges, the respective secretaries,
and the Councilors of the Federal Judicature, as well as the Magistrates of the Superior Chamber of the
Electoral Tribunal, may not, in any case, accept or perform office [empleo] or responsibility [encargo]
of the Federation, of the States, of the Federal District or of individuals [particulares],except for those
non-remunerative offices [cargos] in scientific, educational, literary or charitable associations.").
119. Id.
120. C.P., art. 98 (Mex.) (describing role ofjudges in Electoral Tribunal).
121. Oyarbide, molesto con la Policiapor las versiones del hallazgo del explosivo, LA RAZON
(May 23, 2012), http://www.larazon.com.ar/actualidad/Oyarbide-Policia-versiones-hallazgo-explosivo
0_352800155.html (Judge Norberto Oyarbide investigated the alleged conspiracy to kill Colombian
Former President Alvaro Uribe).
122. Paz Rodriguez Niell, Apartan al juez Rafecas de la causa que involucra a Boudou, LA
NACION (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1468623-apartan-al-juez-rafecas-de-la-causaque-involucra-a-boudou.
123. Constituiqio Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 99 (Braz.).
124. C.F., art. 95.
125. Lei Complementar No. 35, art. 36, de 14 de Mar9o de 1979, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 14.03.1979 (Braz.).
126. COD. ORG. TRIB., arts. 316, 318 (Chile).
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Latin American jurisdictions are similar to European civil law
countries in the way they approach judicial involvement with nonjudicial
functions. Strict statututory laws mix with a more flexible practice derived
from the influence of local judicial councils or the Supreme Court.
Corruption seems to be more of an issue in this context than in Europe.127
A special note should be made of the Bolivian case. In 2005, the
President and Vice-President of Bolivia were forced to resign because of
mass protests, and the Chief Justice became interim President. He presided
over elections, leading to the historic election of President Evo Morales.
Yet shortly afterwards, Congress attempted to impeach the new Chief
Justice because of clashes with President Morales. 128 There is, it seems, a
real risk of politicization that comes from nonjudicial functions of a
certain type.
L. China
Nonjudicial functions in People's Republic of China (PRC) are
regulated by statute, in particular the Judges Law of the PRC
).129 Article 14 is quite clear: "The judges cannot
l@).
(lXAR
serve concurrently as members of the Standing Committee of China's
National People's Congress; or serve concurrently in the agencies,
procuratorate organs, the enterprises and the institutions; or serve
concurrently as lawyers."' 30 Article 14 adds that "judges cannot act as
lawyers, as agents ad litem or defense counsel in two years after their
departure from the court."' 3' So clearly PRC judges are quite limited in
their ability to pursue nonjudicial functions. In fact, the PRC Supreme
Court has published a notice prohibiting in-service judges from acting as
arbitrators (
). Published in 2004, the

127.

EDUARDO BUSCAGLIA, CORRUPTION AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1996).

128. Martin Arostegui, Bolivian ChiefJustice FacesImpeachment Trial, WASH. TIMES (May 22,
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/22/top-iudge-faces-impeachment-trial-in-senate
/?page=all.
129. (99AN)FuU WR) [Judges Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), http://en.china
court.org/public/detail.php?id=2692 (China).
130. Id. art. 14.
131. Id. See also (9-ARRf
[Law on Lawyers] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 41 ("A lawyer who once served as a
judge or prosecutor shall not act as an agent ad litem or defender within two years after leaving his
post in the people's court or the people's procuratorate.").
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notice rules that any in-service judge should quit from the position of
arbitrator within one month. 13 2
In the PRC, there are a few exceptions that reflect some of the
possibilities we have discussed. The Code of Judicial Ethics of the PRC
states the following rule:
Rule 44: A judge may participate in academic research and other
social activities which are helpful in promoting judicial construction
and judicial reform. However, these activities should be in
compliance with the law, construct no obstruction to judicial
impartiality and the preservation of judicial authority and will not
conflict with the judge's judicial function."'
Finally, the involvement of the Chinese judiciary in the administration of
the courts has been regulated by the Judges Law of the PRC, article 6.
This rule states that "Presidents, vice presidents, members of judicial
committees, chief judges, associate chief judges of divisions shall, in
addition to the judicial functions and duties, perform other functions and
duties commensurate with their posts." 1 34
It is apparent that nonjudicial functions in the PRC are quite limited by
a third-party regulation. One possible explanation is that the Chinese
judiciary does not have the political influence or prestige to relax these
regulations. Supply and demand of nonjudicial functions seem weak in an
environment where the judiciary faces other significant challenges, not
least of which is corruption. As institutional reform takes place in the PRC
and courts become more independent and less corrupt, we could see a shift
in demand for nonjudicial functions that might challenge the current strict
regulations. However, such a shift seems a long way off at the moment.
M The Philippines
Non-judicial functions were also at the center of a major controversy
regarding the judiciary in the Philippines. In 1984, Ferdinand Marcos
created a Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), funded with court fees and

132. See
ihJ :A i FWT M [Supreme Court: Serving Judge Shall Not Act as
Arbitrator],CHINACOURT.ORG (July 7, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2004/07/id/125
571.shtml (Chinese).
133. Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges of the People's Republic of China rule 44, as translatedin
James Spigelman, Convergence and the Judicial Role: Recent Developments in China, 55 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 57, 70 (2003).
134. Judges Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 6.
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bar exam fees, to supplement the budget of the judiciary.135 The JDF was
administered by the Supreme Court and was to contribute 80% of its
distributions to employee salaries with the rest going to facilities.136 A
group of disgruntled court staff complained that their salaries were too
low, and got a congressman interested in their case.137 After the court
refused to provide him with information, the congressman accused the
chief justice of illegal use of public funds. The court reacted quite
defensively.138
An independent investigation found very lax oversight over use of the
JDF funds. The congressman then responded with an impeachment
complaint that resulted in several months of hearings. Before the
complaint could be transmitted to the Senate, the court stepped in,
declaring the impeachment complaint unconstitutional, and enjoining the
House and Senate from acting on it. 139 The court relied on a constitutional
provision stating that no impeachment proceeding could be initiated twice
within one year against the same official.140 Another complaint against the
chief justice had just been dismissed.
Administrative responsibilities of managing budgets and personnel are
clearly nonjudicial in nature, yet proponents of judicial independence often
argue that they must be placed with the courts themselves. 141 The
Philippine example illustrates some of the dangers of this approach. By
burdening courts with tasks in which they have no comparative advantage,
there is a risk that courts will perform the job poorly, exposing them to
criticism and controversy.
In the late 2000s, Chief Justice Reynato Puno of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines began to be solicited by many to run for president in
2010.142 In 2009, he met with government officials to discuss his leading a
"transition council," a way to ease President Arroyo out of power. This
proposed body would amend the constitution to fix various problems in
the political system, heightened due to feared technical problems with the

135. Presidential Decree Establishing a Judiciary Development Fund and for Other Purposes, Pres.
Dec. No. 1949 (1984) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecreenol949
.htm#.UVOR8BzvuSo.
136. Id.
137. VITUG, supra note 2, at 61-73.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 80-81.
140. CONST. (1987) art. XI, sec. 3(5) (Phil.).
141. See, e.g., Shimon Shetreet, The Emerging Transnational Jurisprudence on Judicial
Independence: The IBA Standards and Montreal Declaration, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 393 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985).
142. VITUG, supra note 2, at 176.
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elections. 143 When exposed, this led to significant controversy, pressures
to resign, and accusations that the Chief Justice had badly overstepped the
proper role of the judge.
CONCLUSION

If judges are doing their job well, there will be opportunities for them
to become involved in functions outside the courtroom. We have
articulated a positive theory of such judicial involvement in nonjudicial
functions, emphasizing the interaction of demand (why judges want to
perform such roles) and supply (why political and social actors want
judges in nonjudicial functions). In this context, the interaction of supply
and demand may create a potential market failure due to external costs and
the possibility of demand-induced supply. As a consequence, some
regulation is appropriate. Self-regulation seems ineffective given the
likelihood of capture. Most legal systems seem to take an approach
consistent with our theory, limiting judicial involvement in some way. But
the range of regulatory approaches is fairly broad, suggesting that there is
no universal optimum.
We do not, in this Article, wrestle with normative questions, in part
because we do not start with an essentialist view of the judicial role. We
recognize that such roles have evolved over time and are likely to continue
to evolve. Role conceptions differ dramatically across countries as well.
Our empirical survey has shown, though, that there has been a trend
toward expansion of the ambit of judicial decision-making and roles in
many different traditions.

143. Id. at 186-87.

